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Platt: Commodity Futures Account Protection

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
COMMODITY FUTURES ACCOUNT PROTECTION
Probably no subject we write about is more difficult to explain,
or to understand, than trading in commodity futures. That's because you're selling or buying something you'll probably never
see, at a place you can't be, for delivery at a time yet to come. 1

When a Futures Commission Merchant 2 (FCM) becomes insolvent and ceases to function, his customers may suffer serious
financial losses. The purpose of this proposal is to demonstrate the
need for customer protection and to propose a mechanism by
which such insurance might best be provided.
The relationship between the FCM and his customer is one of
reciprocal rights and duties. It is a multifaceted relationship, and
many of the questions involved have been extensively litigated.
Baer and Saxon summarized the broker's duties to his margin customer as follows:3
(1) At once to enter into the contract on the exchange for the
sale or purchase of the commodity according to instructions
4
from the customer.
1. Introduction to Seim, It Cost Me $70,000 To Learn About Futures, FARM J.
H-16 (Feb. 1974), cited in Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974:
Hearingson H.R. 11955 Before the Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 219

(1974).
2. "Futures commission merchant" is defined as:
individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in
soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity
for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market and that,
in or in connection with such solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts
any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result
therefrom.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, § 2, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V
1975). Essentially, a futures commission merchant (FCM) is a broker whom a customer will call to place an order to buy or to sell futures contracts.
3. J. BAER & 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FUTURES TRADING 307
(1949).
4. The contract discussed here is a futures contract. This is a contract to buy
and receive or to sell and deliver a commodity during a specified future month; the
terms of the contract are specified by the exchange upon which the contract is
traded. S. ANGRIST, SENSIBLE SPECULATING IN COMMODITIES 201 (1972).
173
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(2) To carry the contract for the benefit of the customer so long
as the margin 5 is kept good, or until notice is given by either
party that the transaction is to be closed out.
(3) To advance all money required beyond the margin required
of the customer.
(4) To deliver such contract to the customer when required by
him, upon receipt of the advances and commissions accruing
to the broker. 6
Reciprocally, the customer agrees:
(1) To pay the margin required.
(2) To keep good such margin according to the fluctuations of
the market.
(3) To take the contract executed on the exchange, whenever
required by the broker, and to pay the difference between
the sums advanced by himself and the amount paid by the
broker. In addition, of course, the customer is always bound
7
to pay the commissions.

Although the broker or FCM is essentially a middleman, facilitating trades between sellers and buyers, it bears substantial
burdens under the margin system. 8 Brokerage houses often main5. A margin is a sum of money deposited by the trader with the FCM, and by
the FCM with the clearinghouse. The margin acts not as a down payment, as in
securities trades, but rather as a performance bond. Such payments bind the seller
and the buyer, respectively, to deliver and to pay in full. The clearinghouse holds
the margin required on each contract. The trader delivers margin amounts to his
FCM; the FCM "marks to market" and delivers appropriate amounts to the clearinghouse. Frequently, the FCM will hold money, securities, or previously realized
profits for a customer in an account where the amount remains available to cover
margin requirements.
6. J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 3, at 307.
7. Id.
8. FCMs are members of the various exchanges. Baer and Saxon illustrated the
burdens placed upon exchange members:
Exchange members, who deal directly with one another, act as principals.
The member who executes an order on the exchange for his customer is the
principal in the transaction so far as the member, from whom he buys or to
whom he sells, is concerned. He is also the principal so far as the clearing
house is concerned.
Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted). In discussing the clearinghouse, one Guide states:
Should an individual customer of a Commission House become unable to
fulfill either his financial or delivery obligation to the Clearing House, the
obligation must be assumed by the carrying Commission House member itself, using its own funds to make up any customer deficit, if necessary. That
is why brokers insist that margin calls, once made, be answered promptly
and in full. It is also the reason why the commodity account agreement of
each Commission House gives the broker the right to liquidate any position
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tain large commodity accounts through which they trade for their
own accounts. 9 Like any of their customers, they stand to bear
significant losses through speculation. 10 An FCM remains liable on
its customer's open contracts even though the customer defaults."
Thus, several large customer defaults may render the FCM insolvent. Other events may render brokers insolvent, including fraudulent transactions, the broker's inability to compete with larger
FCMs, and ordinary market forces.
In the event of an FCM insolvency, traders dealing through
such an FCM stand to suffer severe financial injury by losing their
margin deposits and by losing control over open positions on fu12
tures contracts and over options.
Commodity futures markets expose speculators to serious
risks. These risks, however, inhere in the speculativeness of futures transactions and are understood and accepted by all traders.
They are "bargained for"; traders consider these risks in evaluating
the likelihood of their success in any particular transaction. Yet the
risk of broker insolvency, and the disastrous financial consequences
of such insolvency, is not a "bargained for" risk. These risks heighten the danger in a commodity futures trade. Since the markets
prosper through increased trading, such risks should be eliminated

of his customer, and without recourse, in the event margin calls are not
promptly met.
General Guide, CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 317, at 1064 (1974).
9. One problem plaguing the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
is "dual trading." Dual trading concerns only a specific type of FCM, the futures
floor trader. Futures traders may trade for their own accounts as well as for their
customers' accounts. This "dual trading" capability is often considered to be the
mechanism by which price distortions are caused, by clever manipulation of clients'
buy, sell, or stop orders by collusive and unscrupulous floor traders who take positions for themselves opposite to those of their customers.
10. One study concluded that 75% of all speculators lost money. Of those who
profited, 84% made less than $1000. See B. STEWART, AN ANALYSIS OF SPECULATIVE TRADING IN GRAIN FuTuREs 57 (USDA Technical Bulletin No. 1001, 1949).
Thomas Hieronymus conducted a similar study, which indicated that 65% of all
speculators lost money, and that 50% of those who profited made less than $1000.
See T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 258-63 (2d ed. 1977). A

third study indicated that an average of 26% of all traders end the year with a profit.
R. TEWELES, C. HARLOW, & H. STONE, THE ComMODrrY FUTURES GAME 296-98 (2d

ed. 1974).
11. See note 8 supra.
12. The term "traders" here refers to all those individuals, partnerships, or corporations who purchase or sell commodity futures contracts or options. This, of
course, includes most customers of an FCM.
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to encourage more speculators to enter the markets. 13 These risks
may be eliminated at a cost which is relatively low compared to the
possible benefits of such elimination.' 4 Dangers to both investors
and the economy necessitate this protection. 15 The problem of
FCM insolvency is not merely theoretical: Two such insolvencies
have occurred within the last four years in New York alone. 1 6 The
J.S. Love bankruptcy 17 was precipitated by improper conduct on
the part of Love's trading associates. The accounts had not been
properly segregated,' 8 nor had the recordkeeping met the re13. The commodity futures markets serve an essential economic function, permitting farmers, producers, and other persons whose livelihoods depend on the production or sale of commodities to "hedge," and thus to protect themselves against
declining markets. A farmer may enter the market and short (sell) wheat at a known
price a year or more before it is grown. He can thus calculate his prospective profits
without fear of a decline in the price of wheat by the time it is ready for sale. On the
other hand, the hazards involved in production of commodities and in concomitant
price fluctuations may yield windfall profits for producers or growers. The "hedger"
exchanges this possibility of windfall profits for the security of a known price. The
speculator, on the other hand, assumes all the risks and possible windfalls of wide
price fluctuations. Without speculators willing to accept these risks, producers would
be unable to hedge. Increased speculation and trading increases the liquidity of the
market. Liquidity enables hedgers to enter or leave the market at will.
14. See proposal at text accompanying notes 104-110 infra.
15. For a contrary opinion, see the recent report of the CFTC. CFTC, REPORT
TO CONGRESS CONCERNING COMMODITY FUTunEs ACCOUNT INSURANCE (1976), reprinted in part in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,235
(1976) [hereinafter cited as CFTC REPORT]. For a critique of this Report, see discussion at notes 51-76 infra and accompanying text.
16. See CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Weis Sec., Inc., [1975-1977
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
17. On March 1, 1976, permanent injunctions against J.S. Love & Associates Consultants, Inc., and James Spencer Love, Jr. were issued and an
order appointing a temporary receiver for the companies was issued on consent. Permanent injunctions on consent against Leonard Irwin Freedman
and Melvin Cantor were issued on March 3, 1976 and against Arlene Karian
on March 10, 1976. On April 9, 1976, after the first day of the hearing held
on the CFTC's motion for a preliminary injunction, Charles Lemieux consented to the entry of an order of permanent injunction. On March 11, 1976
the companies filed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy in this Court, and on
April 13, 1976, Paul Krohn, Esq. was appointed trustee for each company by
Bankruptcy Judge John Galgay.
CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUr. L.
REP. (CCH) T 20,198, at 21,100 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
18. An FCM must:
treat and deal with all money, securities, and property received by such
[FCM] to margin, guarantee, or secure the trades or contracts of any customer of such [FCM], or accruing to such customer as the result of such
trades or contracts, as belonging to such customer. Such money, securities,
and property shall be separately accounted for and shall not be commingled
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quirements of regulation 1.32.19 As of this writing, many of Love's
customers still have not recovered much of their money. Paul
Krohn, the trustee in bankruptcy, was still attempting to untangle
the accounts held by Love in a single "omnibus" account in London.2 0 In the Weis bankruptcy, 2 1 the accounts of commodity futures customers have been used to reimburse securities customers. 22 This inequitable situation resulted from the imbalance
caused by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 23 (SIPC),
which has no counterpart intended to protect the interests of commodity futures customers.
The overextension of credit by banks, which resulted in numerous bank failures, in large part precipitated the Great Depression. 24 Public confidence in banking institutions had been sewith the funds of such commission merchant ....
7 U.S.C. § 6d (Supp. V 1975).
19. An accounting of such segregated amounts "shall be computed by each
[FCM] as of the close of the market each business day." 17 C.F.R. § 1.32 (1977).
20. The "omnibus" account was a single account in which all monies, futures,
and options of Love's customers were held. See Hearing for Determination of Ownership of Options, CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Report of Temporary
Receiver at 3 n.3, CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
CoMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
21. Weis See., Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
20,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See discussion at notes 86-90 infra and accompanying text.
22. This bankruptcy and liquidation was brought about pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff (1970). Amounts directly
traceable to commodity futures customers' accounts were used solely in satisfaction
of commodity customers' claims. The "single and separate fund" of customers' property, however, was used exclusively to satisfy the claims of securities customers.
The basis for this decision was the definition of "customer" given in the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970. See generally note 89 infra. The court stated that
trading in commodity futures, "when done by those not in the business of producing
or dealing in such commodities, but rather by those who seek to profit merely by
dealing in the paper futures, is speculation rather than investment." Weis Sec.,
Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. Fut. L. REP. (CCH) 20,108, at 20,789
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
23. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation was created by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1970 & Supp. V
1975). Its purpose is "to provide investors protection against losses caused by the
insolvency of their broker-dealer." H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1905,
reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5254, 5255.
24. Representative Steagall stated the case more aptly in discussion on the floor
of the House of Representatives on May 20, 1933:
Agriculture is prostrate. Industry is crushed. Trade and commerce, both
domestic and foreign, have been paralyzed. Bank credit has been destroyed.
Confidence has vanished and hope has been deferred until the hearts of the
struggling masses are sick. These conditions culminated in the complete collapse of the banking system of the Nation ....
77 CONG. REc. 3835 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall).
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verely damaged. To aid in the recovery of the banks, Congress
passed the Federal Depositor's Insurance Act.2 5 This Act created
the Federal Depositor's Insurance Corporation, which was designed:
to strengthen the banking structure, to establish adequate capital
requirements, to provide more effective regulation and supervision, to eliminate dangerous and unsound practices, and to confine banks of deposit to legitimate functions and to separate
them from affiliates or other organizations
vhich have brought
26
discredit and loss of public confidence.
Representative Steagall stated on the House floor: "President
Roosevelt in his inaugural address spoke the truth when he declared that fear is the underlying cause of our present economic
difficulty. We must banish this fear if we are to put an end to the
depression. The one indispensable remedy is insurance of bank
deposits. "27
Thus, should a bank become insolvent, its investors' deposits
are insured. 28 The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation2 9 provides equivalent protection for savings and loan institutions. Similarly, the Securities Investor Protection Act of 197030
(the SIPA) created the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
to protect securities investors' properties in brokerage bankruptcies. 3 1
Commodity futures customers need similar protection. A
25. Ch. 89, § 12B, 48 Stat. 168 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1970
& Supp. V 1975)).
26. 77 CONG. REC. 3835 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall).
27. Id. at 3840.
28. The deposits are insured only to the extent of the first $40,000. Federal
Depositor's Insurance Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (Supp. V 1975).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-7811l (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
31. SIPC's success has exceeded all expectations. The New York Times noted:
Securities Fund May Cut Assessments by Brokers
Stockbrokers are apparently doing so well these days that the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation-set up a few years ago to help customers of
brokers in trouble-may reduce broker assessments to a bail-out fund, the
agency reported yesterday.
Hugh F. Owens, chairman, said that, because broker liquidations had fallen in the last few years, the S.I.P.C. fund now stood at about $106 million.
He said that once the fund reached $150 million, or such other amount determined to be in the public interest, the agency "may lower assessments."
Mr. Owens said that at the present rate the fund could reach $150 million
within two years.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1976, at 57, col. 3.
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workable formula for the implementation of such protection is detailed below.
THE

NEED FOR PROTECTION

As the introductory quotation implies, few prospective traders
32
are familiar with the mechanics of commodity futures contracts.
Still fewer are familiar with the intricate workings of markets and
exchanges. One of the few facts generally known about the markets
is that every trade carries a high degree of risk. Studies conducted
within the past decade indicate that between 65% and 75% of all
traders ultimately lose money; 3 3 small traders lose disproportionately more. 34 The additional risk of broker insolvency increases
the overall risk of loss, but it is not "bargained for" by traders. To
elucidate the need for the proposed protection, it will be useful to
explore some of the problems likely to arise in the event of an FCM
insolvency. We shall assume that the FCM has ceased conducting
35
business and executing orders.
Hypothetical A: Customer S holds an open position on a contract to buy grain. The current price of that contract is less than
the price he paid for it, and the prospects look grim. S wishes to
take an opposite position on the same contract and thus "close
36
out" his trade.

This is a typical situation confronting a commodity futures contracts
trader. In our example, S wishes to sustain a known loss now instead of holding his contract open, risking a greater loss. However,
since the FCM has ceased executing orders, S cannot secure the
execution of his order. He is trapped in a situation in which he
may suffer substantial losses. 3 7 Since, unlike the securities inves32. Observe the title of the article cited note 1 supra.
33. See note 10 supra.
34. See also article cited note 1 supra.
35. This occurred in J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
CoMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). All order execution ceased, a
temporary receiver was appointed, and customers were unable to contact their FCM.
Many of the letters sent by discouraged customers to Judge Galgay's court are on file
in the Southern District of New York. The tone of these letters is unequivocal desperation.
36. One closes out a trade by executing an order exactly opposite to one previously executed through the same FCM. Thus, if S were long 10 contracts of May
wheat, S would close out by shorting 10 contracts of May wheat through the same
FCM. The result is a paper profit or loss; the trader is relieved of any obligation
either to deliver or to accept delivery of the wheat.
37. The trader is trapped only in the sense that he does not know, and may
have great difficulty discovering, the current status of his contracts. If the exchange

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 173

tor, the commodities trader holds an executory contract, it may be
impossible for S to predict the possible extent of his loss. The loss
sustained by a securities investor is limited to the value of his securities; the loss sustained by a commodity futures speculator is
theoretically limitless. 38 An observer might suggest that S immediately contact another FCM and take the opposite position
through him. Unfortunately, unless the opposing trades are conducted through the same FCM, the trade will never be closed
out.3 9 The uncertainty concerning the present status of one's account may result in traders taking positions "opposite" to formerly
"open" accounts that may already have been closed out by the
ex40
change.
Hypothetical B: Customer S holds an open position on a contract to buy grain. The current price of that contract is greater
than the price he paid for it. S wishes to close out his position
and take his profit.
This is another very common situation, albeit not as common
as that in hypothetical A. S wishes to take certain profit now
rather than speculative profit later. Since his FCM has ceased to
execute orders, he cannot close out his position. The trader is
trapped in a volatile market that may radically reverse itself, causing him serious losses before he can close out.
Hypothetical C: An FCM becomes insolvent and cannot meet
his financial obligations. According to the general rules of the
has automatically closed out all of his positions, he may open new positions through

another FCM; if his contracts remain open, he may take opposite positions through
another FCM. However, he will not be technically closed out, and in the event he
has taken opposite positions with another FCM, he may be injured later when the
clearinghouse ultimately closes out his original open position. The "trap" is a consequence of the customer's lack of knowledge which resulted from the insolvency.
38. For example, S "shorts" or sells 10 contracts of May wheat. He expects the
price of May wheat to drop, at which time he will buy 10 contracts and close out.
Due to unforeseen circumstances, the price of May wheat triples within three days.
S cannot close out without taking substantial losses, the extent of which was entirely
unforeseeable. The extent of the loss depends on the fluctuation in price; the price
might have increased tenfold. Consider the prices of sugar, cocoa, coffee, and
oranges in recent months. Note that one may "short" securities with equivalent inestimable losses.
39. See S. KROLL & I. SsUSHKO, THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET GUIDE
204 (1973).
40. There are several situations in which an exchange may close out an open
account. One such situation is the insolvency of the FCM. CoMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 317(4)(a) (1974). The exchange needs this authority because a customer who
does not know whether his account is open or closed cannot cover his position.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss1/10

8

Platt: Commodity Futures Account Protection

19771

COMMODITY FUTURES ACCOUNT PROTECTION

clearinghouses, the first step in dealing with the insolvency is to
liquidate "[a]ll contracts open on the failed member's books."41
Customer S wishes to maintain his newly profitable open positions.

In light of the foregoing discussion, this presents a significant problem. The customer may be unaware of the mandated procedure or
uncertain whether the clearinghouse has followed it.
Hypothetical D: S, holder of an option to purchase a particular
contract for a certain price, wishes to exercise his option. Since
his FCM has become insolvent, he cannot do so.

A futures option 42 is very time-sensitive property. A newly purchased option may become valuable in two months, in two minutes, or never. It may remain valuable for two minutes or two
months. Thus, an order to exercise an option must be executed
swiftly. Where an insolvent FCM has ceased to execute orders, S's
option may quickly become valueless or may expire.
Hypothetical E: Trader S has placed a "stop loss" order43 with
his FCM. This type of order requires the FCM to close the
customer out when the market price for a particular contract
reaches a prescribed level. S has thus attempted to minimize the
possible negative consequences of a particular trade.

Here the problem of failure to execute becomes even more pronounced. A trader places a "stop loss" order to prevent the type of

41.

Id.

42. A "futures contract" is a bilateral executory contract to buy and receive or
to sell and deliver a commodity during a specified future month with the terms of
the contract specified by the futures exchange on which the contract is traded. A "futures option" consists of the right to purchase or to sell a futures contract at a specified price at any time prior to expiration of the option. The amount paid for the option
is known as a "premium." If, at some time prior to expiration, the market price of
the underlying futures contract exceeds the price specified in the option, a "call" or
buy option may be exercised. For example, if S holds an option to buy a May wheat
contract for $10 and the price of a May wheat contract rises to $12, S will exercise
the option and buy the contracts at $10. S will then sell the contracts on the market
at $12. His net gain will be $2 per contract less the premium he paid for the option.
43. A "stop" order is defined as:
an order placed at a limit above the prevailing market price in the case of a
buy stop, or below the existing level in the case of a sell stop, that will not
be executed until the stop price has been reached ....
When such an order
is placed, an existing position will be liquidated only if there is a price
movement adverse to the position.
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SirrH INC., HANDBOOK FOR COMMODrrY
SPECULATORS 10

(1975).
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entrapment that may occur when the market begins to dive or
climb. In this case it has done him no good.
Hypothetical F: Trader S holds a "discretionary account" 44 with
an FCM. If the FCM has ceased to function, the discretionary
account may suffer due to lack of proper management.
In addition to the difficulties raised by these hypotheticals, signifi45
cant problems arise in 4 6relation to "good-'til-canceled" orders,
"good-the-week" orders, "limit" orders, 47 "market-if-touched" orders, 48 and various other orders that remain dormant until the market moves in a specified manner.
These dangers inhere in any broker insolvency regardless of
the cause of insolvency. Thus, the protection sought for customers
of insolvent FCMs must protect the accounts of all FCMs without
regard to cause. Financial mismanagement by a firm or its employees, failure to segregate funds and futures, and other "fault"
causes should be included in this coverage. Exceptions may be
made in exceptional circumstances, such as where the customer is
a wrongdoer, or where the customer held a substantial proprietary
interest in the brokerage.
Early in 1974, Congress considered providing some type of
account insurance for commodity futures traders. Section 417 of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 197449 required the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to
submit to Congress, not later than June 30, 1976, a report on the
feasibility and desirability of such insurance. No report was submitted by the CFTC until August 1976. In essence, the report
reiterated the 1974 statute, stating:
44. A "discretionary account" gives the FCM power of attorney to trade the
customer's account as the FCM deems profitable.
45. A "good-'til-canceled" order is an order to buy or to sell which remains
effective until it is filled by the FCM or canceled by the customer. If the FCM is inoperative, circumstances requiring the execution of the order may arise and pass without execution.
46. A "good-the-week" order remains effective for a week. It will not be executed if the FCM has ceased to function.
47. A "limit" order permits the broker to buy for not more than, or sell for not
less than, a stated price.
48. A "market-if-touched" order is an order to buy or to sell at the market immediately if an execution takes place at a certain price stated in the order. S.
ANGRIST, SENSIBLE SPECULATING IN COMMODITIES 198-206 (1972) provides an excellent glossary which defines these and other technical terms relating to commodity
futures.
49. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 417, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4a note (Supp.
V 1975)).
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In order to determine whether an insurance program should be
established, it is necessary to analyze such matters as:
-the incidence of FCM insolvencies;
-the adequacy of exchange trust funds;
-the cost of the program;
-the amount of coverage that should be afforded;
-how the program would be financed and administered;
-the amount of reserves that should be available to the program;
--who should be a member;
-whether private insurance would be feasible; and
-whether commodity account insurance could be integrated
with the securities account insurance provided by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. 50

On November 1, 1976, the CFTC completed its research into this
question and concluded that legislation providing insurance to futures customers is unnecessary. 51 The two reasons given to justify
this conclusion were: "a. the level of public confidence in the
safety of funds appears to be relatively high, and b. the benefit-cost
ratios demonstrate that insurance protection would not be cost
effective."52

The first of these conclusions is subject to doubt; 53 the second
is demonstrably inaccurate. The cost of an account insurance program such as that proposed here would be minimal. The reason
for the CFTC's miscalculation as to the cost of such a program appears from the report itself. The calculations made by the CFTC
were based on a "hypothetical commodity account insurance fund
. . . and [were] compared to similar ratios calculated for existing
government-sponsored insurance programs." 54 As this proposal
50. Advisory Board to the CFTC, Commodity Futures Trading Professionals,
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) Special Report No. 29 (Aug. 20, 1976).
51. See CFTC REPORT, supra note 15.
52. Id. at vi.
53. Scholars who lecture on commodity futures speculation have observed:
Wide publicity is given to the relatively rare but highly dramatic manipulations that cause many to conclude that speculation is not only gambling but
that the game is dishonest besides. Almost any public speaker talking about
commodity trading can be sure that someone in the audience will ask about
"that big soybean oil scandal of a few years ago" [the Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining Corporation scandal] or some similar incident.
R. TEWELES, C. HARLow, & H. STONE, THE COMMODITY FUTURES GAME 13 (2d ed.
1974) (footnote omitted). Professor Hieronymus also alludes to this general public
cynicism, which he finds unfair and inaccurate. T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF
FUTURES TRADING 6-7 (2d ed. 1977).
54. CFTC REPORT, supra note 15, at v.
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will demonstrate, inexpensive account insurance can be provided
for commodity futures accounts because commodity futures differ
fundamentally from every other type of account insured.
Because the CFTC failed to perceive this fundamental difference, its Report to Congress Concerning Commodity Futures Account Insurance (the Report) is seriously flawed. The following innovative approach to account protection cannot be compared to other
existing federal insurance plans on a strict loss-reimbursement
55
basis.
The CFTC stated in its Report that the segregation of accounts

would protect commodity speculators from loss of funds in FCM
insolvency. 56 The CFTC concluded that such funds would be unavailable to satisfy the claims of general creditors; 57 this, it observed, "has never been challenged in an appellate court."5' 8 Although it is true that this conclusion has never been challenged in
an appellate court, there is neither assurance that it will not be
challenged, nor assurance that it will withstand challenge.

The Report claimed that additional protection is afforded by
the "adjusted working capital" requirement of Commission regulation 1.17(a). 59 That regulation requires an FCM to "have an adjusted working capital equal to or greater than $10,000 or the sum
of a number of safety factors plus 5 percent of the FCM's aggregate
debt." 60 This minimal amount will purportedly protect the approximately 120,000 open commodity futures accounts presently held
55. The CFTC REPORT, id., did not accurately respond to the request of § 417
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974. The demand for a
report was formulated after lengthy discussion in Congress regarding the advisability of account insurance. From the discussion on the Senate floor, it seems that
Congress wished the CFTC to propose different types of insurance, not to issue an
accountant-like analysis of the feasibility of a SIPC in the commodities area. But see
CFTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 62. Dr. Clayton Yeutter, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, articulated the general feelings of Congress regarding account insurance,
stating:
[I]t seems to me some significant questions have been raised with regard to
the structure of this kind of insurance entity .... No one disagrees with the
concept. I believe that all of us feel that an insurance system would contribute to protection of the participants in the markets. The only question is how
this can best be done.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1974) (statement of Dr. Clayton Yeutter,
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture).
56. See CFTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 6-8 & n.13.
57. See id. at 8.
58. Id. at 8 n.13.
59. Id. at 9.
60. Id. The exact text of the regulation appears at 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1977).
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by FCMs, each account having equity ranging from minor amounts
to sums far in excess of $50,000.61
The Report indicated several other proposals which would
eventually be of some value to commodity futures traders. For example, an "early warning system to alert the CFTC of FCM's or
commodity option dealers which are undercapitalized or do not
meet segregation requirements" 62 was suggested. Yet this system
would be unnecessary if the act proposed here were enacted. 63
The proposed act encompasses the goals of this mechanism in its
overall scheme.
The Report contained some general misconceptions regarding
commodity futures options. For example, the Report observed: "If
options dealers are thus regulated [and required to segregate customer funds], the potential for future customer losses due to insolvencies should be reduced to frequencies similar to those for
FCM's under regulation." 64 This observation is inaccurate. Open
futures contracts may be closed by an exchange in the event of
FCM insolvency without undue difficulty. While the risks involved
are great, at least some protection is afforded the contract holder.
An option, on the other hand, may become extremely profitable
before it expires; an insolvency prevents the exercise of options,
and thus results in the loss of the full value of all options held. A
contract does not necessarily become worthless if neglected; an op61. See CFTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 67-68.
62. Id. at 10. Evidently satisfied with its Report, the CFTC seems to have abandoned investigation of possible insurance plans. On June 16, 1977, the CFTC proposed a new rule "to insure adequate customer protection, to insure the integrity of
the futures market system, to increase regulatory efficiency, and to facilitate the development of a registered futures association." 42 Fed. Reg. 31,740 (1977). The proposed rule would create an early warning system which would require FCMs to report to the CFTC in the event that certain financial situations arose. In addition, the
CFTC proposed to increase the FCMs' minimum financial requirements. The early
warning system is a good first step, but it is inadequate. The CFTC does not detail
the response it would give upon receipt of an early warning. Presumably, it would
simply observe that FCM more closely. Incidents such as the Love, Weis, and Goldstein, Samuelson bankruptcies, however, would inevitably occur; how the CFTC
proposes to deal with such cases remains unclear. While preventive measures are to
be encouraged, curative measures must be developed to deal with the next FCM
insolvency. The Goldstein, Samuelson bankruptcy reputedly cost commodity traders
approximately $70,000,000. Maidenberg, When the Commodity Pitchman Calls,
Hang Up, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1977, § 3, at 3, col. 1. It is doubtful that the measures
proposed by the CFTC suffice to deal with the problem posed by Goldstein,
Samuelson.
63. See text accompanying notes 104-110 infra.
64. CFTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 18 (citation omitted).
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tion automatically becomes worthless when the period for its exercise expires. Such basic misconceptions undermine the validity of
the CFTC Report: A thorough analysis of the economic feasibility
of the proposed program would likely indicate a favorable "benefitcost ratio,"6 5 evidently the Commission's primary measure of the
value of a program.66
An important inconsistency lies at the core of the CFTC's Report. The Report concedes that "[t]he existing environment in the
commodities industry can be boiled down to the fact that, in spite

of regulation, a certain risk of loss exists because of fraudulent behavior on the part of FCM's."67 The Report does not define "existing
environment." It explains, however, that the fraudulent behavior
of FCMs is subject to fines and penalties, "powerful deterrent[s] to
fraudulent behavior." 68 The "existing environment" to which the Report alludes is precisely the condition it later denies: Commodity
futures markets in general, and FCMs in particular, are plagued by
a general and abiding lack of public confidence. By its own terminology, the Report exposes this prevalent attitude as more than
just a problem; it is, rather, an existing environment in the commodities industry.
The CFTC's assurances that fines and penalties will deter
fraudulent behavior on the part of FCMs are misplaced. The individual who seeks automobile theft insurance is undaunted by the
knowledge that criminal sanctions may deter theft; one purchases
insurance for the simple reason that thefts, and indeed frauds,
69
occur with regularity regardless of the sanctions.
Senator Robert J. Dole observed that "[t]he bankruptcy or insolvency of a futures commission merchant, while a very infrequent
65. The "benefit-cost ratio," which indicates the prospective profitability of a
program, is the main topic of the CFTC Report. Following a basic introduction of
22 pages, the Report analyzes account insurance on the basis of this "benefit-cost
ratio." See CFTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 23-62.
66. See generally id. passim.
67. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Professor Mark R. Greene has stated that:
[A] basic purpose of insurance is to reduce the degree of risk perceived by
the customer. To the extent that negative mental attitudes concerning this
risk are relieved-a powerful deterrent to action is removed .... There are
many examples of insurance in which annual losses are almost miniscule
(e.g., title insurance), but in which the financial guarantees are significant
devices to facilitate business transactions due to the risk reduction factor.
Letter from Mark R. Greene to John W. Helmuth (July 16, 1976), quoted in CFTC
REPORT, supra note 15, at 46-47.
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occurrence, can jeopardize large sums held for customers by that
broker. [A Federal Insurance Corporation established to protect
commodity accounts] would minimize risks of loss to customers and
70
thereby encourage trading."
Furthermore, the Subcommittee on Special Small Business
Problems has concluded that such an insurance plan would protect,
if not enhance, the economy:
[S]ome form of protection is necessary as the bankruptcy or insolvency of a futures commission merchant, while an infrequent
occurrence, can place in jeopardy large sums of money held for
customers by that firm and any such losses could lead to a serious loss of public confidence
and subsequent further deteriora71
tion of the futures markets.
The subcommittee also noted that "the concern over losses is
magnified because of the closely intertwined nature of the industry
as if one firm goes, it could easily have a domino effect and topple
72
other firms which were doing business with it."
Testifying at public hearings on behalf of the Chicago Board of
Trade, Philip F. Johnson stated that public confidence was an important factor in considering account protection, and that such protection is needed.7 3 The Chicago Board of Trade Clearing Corporation, the New York Cocoa Exchange, Inc., and various other
74
concerns supported implementation of an insurance plan.
Finally, only twice in the sixty-nine page CFTC Report does
the CFTC address the potential value such a program might yield
to society. While the Report stresses the "costs to society of such
an insurance fund," 75 it largely ignores the potential advantages of
such protection.7 6 The costs to society include only the minimal
70. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings on S. 2485, S.
2578, S. 2837 & H.R. 13113 Before the Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1974) (statement of Senator Dole).
71. SUBCOMM. ON SPECIAL SMALL BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF THE PERMANENT
SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, SMALL BUSINESS PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE
MARKETING OF GRAIN AND OTHER COMMODnEs, H.R. REP. No. 963, 93d Cong.,

2d Sess. 62 (1974).
72. Id. at 61.
73. CFTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 40, 43.
74. Id. at 40.
75. Id. at 31.
76. Concerning the value of these social benefits, the Report observed: "Trying
to measure these benefits is like trying to measure the benefit one individual American receives because of the existence of the Strategic Air Command." CFTC
REPORT, supra note 15, at 31. That these benefits are difficult to measure is a poor
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transaction fees necessary to establish the initial fund. However,
these fees are borne not by society, but only by commodity futures
traders. The benefits to society, on the other hand, are potentially
great. If, therefore, trading in futures is to be encouraged, an insurance plan such as that proposed would make speculation more
attractive to otherwise hesitant individuals. Simply stated, the insurance plan would benefit the economy and thus society.
Before expounding the proposed plan, it is helpful to examine
an alternative solution raised in the CFTC's August report.
INTEGRATION WITH

SIPC

The Securities Investor Protection Act of 197077 seems analogous to the type of protection here suggested. It will be shown,
first, why integration of a commodity account insurance plan would
be inappropriate, and second, why this type of plan is impracticable in the commodities area.
The initial report issued by the Advisory Board to the CFTC
posed the question "whether commodity account insurance could
be integrated with the securities account insurance provided by the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation."78 The logic behind
this suggestion seems ineluctable: Securities brokerages are often
FCMs as well; securities investors are often commodity speculators
as well; the SIPC has operated successfully for some time; 79 commodity futures, like securities, are an investment vehicle.
However, like the securities market, the futures market is
"[iln some respects . . . unique, and its problems and practices
require original solutions." 8 0 Five reasons militate against such integration and in favor of the creation of an independent protection
corporation for commodity accounts.
First, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
197481 created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and
gave that Commission exclusive jurisdiction to regulate and control

reason to dismiss them out-of-hand. These are precisely the kinds of considerations
Congress ought to weigh most heavily in considering the advisability of adopting
such a plan.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-78111 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

78. See note 50 supra.
79. See note 31 supra.

80. This characterization of the securities markets was offered in discussion of
the need for SIPC. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1905, reprinted in
[1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5254, 5255.
81. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-22 (Supp. V 1975).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss1/10

16

Platt: Commodity Futures Account Protection
COMMODITY FUTURES ACCOUNT PROTECTION

trading in commodity futures. 82 Congress manifestly expressed its
intent to place all such matters within the sole discretion of the
CFTC. The Securities Investor Protection Act of 197083 conferred
numerous powers on the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).8 4
Giving the SEC such control over commodity futures might violate congressional intent in establishing an autonomous agency.
Second, the CFTC devotes its full resources to the regulation
of commodity futures trading. Hence the expertise required to
formulate and oversee a customer account protection mechanism
lies peculiarly within the domain of the CFTC.
Third, the requisite legislation can be drafted precisely to suit
the needs of commodity futures accounts. Integration with SIPC
would likely result in an inoperable patchwork system.
Fourth, the fund from which SIPC compensates securities customers constitutes a sum of assessments collected from member
securities brokerages pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970.85 It would be unfair to those contributors to subject
the fund to liabilities incurred through FCM insolvencies since
FCMs have never contributed to the fund. Rather, a discrete fund
comprised of similar assessments against FCMs constitutes a more
appropriate source of protection.
Fifth, a separate corporation could better protect the interests
of commodity futures customers in insolvencies in which the FCM
had also been a securities broker. Bankruptcy proceedings are
often adversarial in nature, and in cases in which the interests of
futures customers and securities customers collide, a completely
separate entity could best represent the interests of futures customers. In this manner, potential conflicts of interest are avoided;
accusations of prejudice on the part of SIPC in favor of securities
customers are eliminated. Weis Securities, Inc. ,86 conclusively demonstrates that the needs of futures customers and those of securities customers frequently diverge and occasionally clash. Weis
82. Id. § 2.
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
84. For examples of these grants of power, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bbb, 78ccc(e)(1),
78ddd(c)(1) (1970). In addition, three of the seven directors of SIPC are selected
"from among persons who are associated with, and representative of different aspects
of, the securities industry." 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(c)(2)(C)(i) (1970).
85. SIPC assesses a percentage of the gross commission revenues of each of its

members. These revenues comprise a fund from which insurance for customer losses
is provided. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(a)-(i) (1970).
86.

[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)

20,108 (S.D.N.Y.

1975).
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underscores the need for protecting commodity futures accounts. 87
The very existence of SIPC operates to the disadvantage of
commodity futures customers. Weis, decided October 23, 1975, reveals the present predicament of commodity customers: SIPC protects securities investors at the expense of all other creditors, including commodity traders. 88 In Weis a brokerage house that dealt
in both securities and commodity futures became insolvent. The
commodity futures customers attempted to secure the protection
provided by SIPC to "customers." 8 9 The court defined "customers"
to include only securities investors, and proceeded to characterize
commodity traders as "simply creditors of the general estate." 90
The zealous efforts of the SIPC have thus operated to the detriment of commodity futures customers.
SIMLARTY TO SIPC
Although a commodity futures account protection program
should be separate from SIPA, many of the mechanisms provided
in that Act may be remodeled to suit the needs of commodity fu87. In Weis See., Inc., id., both securities customers and commodity futures
customers sought to recover various monies. Part of the money sought was from the
"single and separate fund" held by the broker to cover the margins of his customers.
SIPC protected securities customers; futures customers protected themselves. Id.
Since Congress conferred broad protective powers on SIPC, it came as no surprise
that the commodities customers were defeated. Yet to confer this privileged status
on a particular group of investors is irrational. Had SIPC been empowered to defend
futures customers as well, the conflict of interest questions generated would have
posed vexatious problems.
88. The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111
(1970 & Supp. V 1975) sets forth the purposes and scope of the SIPC.
89. The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 states in pertinent part:
"[Clustomers" of a debtor means persons (including persons with whom the
debtor deals as principal or agent) who have claims on account of securities
received, acquired, or held by the debtor from or for the account of such
persons (I) for safekeeping, or (II) with a view to sale, or (III) to cover consummated sales, or (IV) pursuant to purchases, or (V) as collateral security,
or (VI) by way of loans of securities by such persons to the debtor, and shall
include persons who have claims against the debtor arising out of sales or
conversions of such securities, and shall include any person who has deposited cash with the debtor for the purpose of purchasing securities, but shall
not include any person to the extent that such person has a claim for property which by contract, agreement, or understanding, or by operation of law,
is part of the capital of the debtor or is subordinated to the claims of creditors of the debtor.
15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1970) (emphasis added).
90. Weis See., Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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tures accounts. To understand the differences between the Securities Investor Protection Act 91 and the proposed legislation, one
must first understand the basic structure of the SIPC. Thus, a brief
outline of the SIPA may prove helpful.
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 created the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation, an independent body
comprised of members. 92 Every broker, dealer, or member of a
national securities exchange is a member of the SIPC. 93 Annually,
each member contributes an assessment consisting of a fixed percentage of commissions earned in the course of business. 94 All assessments collected are added to a fund to be used to compensate
95
all securities customers injured by broker insolvency.
When the SEC or any self-regulatory organization, that is,
an exchange, becomes aware of facts leading to the belief that any
broker or dealer is approaching financial difficulty, it must notify
SIPC immediately. 96 If SIPC determines that such broker or
dealer has "failed or is in danger of failing to meet its obligations to
customers" 9 7 or that a court has found the broker or dealer insolvent, SIPC applies to a court for a decree providing that SIPA
should apply. 98 The court then stays all other proceedings against
the debtor and appoints a trustee "for the liquidation of the business of the debtor." 9 9
The purposes of such liquidation are specified in the Act:
(1) as promptly as possible after such appointment and in accordance with the provisions of this section(A) to return specifically identifiable property to the customers of the debtor entitled thereto;
(B) to distribute the single and separate fund, and (in advance thereof or concurrently therewith) pay to customers moneys advanced by SIPG, as provided in subsection
(f) of this section;
(2) to operate the business of the debtor in order to complete
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
account.
96.
97.
98.
99.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 78cc(a).
Id. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A)-(B).
Id. § 78ddd.
Id. The protection provided, however, covers only the first $50,000 of the
Id. § 78fff(f)(1).
Id. §§ 78eee(a)(1)-(2).
Id. § 78eee(a)(2).
Id.
Id. § 78eee(b)(2)-(3).
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open contractual commitments of the debtor pursuant to subsection (d) of this section;
(3) to enforce rights of subrogation as provided in this chapter;
and
(4) to liquidate the business of the debtor. 100
Thus, under SIPC, securities held by the debtor for the customer's
account are delivered directly to the customer. In addition, the
single and separate fund of the broker, consisting of all property
received, acquired, or held by or for the account of customers
is then ratably divided among the customers.
At this point, the difficulty in applying SIPA to commodity
futures accounts manifests itself. A security represents a fractional
interest in a corporation. It constitutes property, and securities investors would gladly receive such specifically identifiable property
from the insolvent debtor. A commodity futures contract, on the
other hand, is an executory contract which speculators buy or sell
in the hope of profitably "unloading" later. Few traders participating in daily trading ever intend to make or take delivery on the
contracts in which they deal. 10 ' Thus, while a securities customer
might be quite pleased to receive his shares of stock, a futures
trader would be horrified to receive a contract which requires him
to sell and deliver 10,000 bushels of wheat.
THE PROBLEM

Thus far, this proposal has indicated the need for protection
for commodity futures accounts and has illustrated the mechanism
by which securities accounts are protected. The best type of protection for any individual, a type which SIPC utterly fails to provide, is a system by which all expectations of the customer are
satisfied. SIPC does not function immediately. Given the laborious
procedures inherent in the SIPA, many months may elapse between insolvency and the customers' recovery. A plan that would
satisfy the immediate needs of the customer would be far superior.
By preventing damage, losses would be averted and expenses
minimized.
Assuming, then, that commodity futures accounts would be

100. Id. § 78fff(a).
101. Physical delivery of the underlying commodity takes place on very few
futures contracts. See T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FuTuREs TRADING 42 (2d
ed. 1977).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss1/10

20

Platt: Commodity Futures Account Protection

COMMODITY FUTURES ACCOUNT PROTECTION

best protected by meeting the customers' expectations, these expectations must be determined precisely.
The services performed by the FCM for the customer have
been divided into four types. First, the FCM provides the customer with a contact with which he can deal personally. Second, the FCM guarantees the customer's contracts to the clearinghouse, makes and takes delivery of the commodities, and pays
money upon delivery or offset. Third, the FCM serves as custodian
of the customer's funds and renders a regular accounting of profits,
losses, and balances. Fourth, the FCM provides the customer with
information. 10 2 The most important service, however, is that the
FCM provides the best possible order execution. A very important
component of good order execution is speed. Given the rapid fluctuations in going prices for different commodities, it is essential
that trades be executed when ordered, not five or ten minutes
later when the going price may have shifted drastically.
While the price of a security may also fluctuate daily, the degree of fluctuation is rarely as great as that in the price of commodity futures. 1 0 3 Moreover, securities ownership is generally of greater duration; a "short-term" investment might extend to the better
part of one year. On the other hand, a "round turn" in the futures
market, a trade in which a contract is bought and then sold, or sold
and then bought, may be opened and closed within five minutes;
millions of dollars may be gained or lost within a few minutes.
10 4
Such rapid transactions are the rule rather than the exception.
One specialized type of trader unknown to the securities market is
the "day trader," one who carries no open positions overnight. As
this discussion emphasizes, the FCM qualities most important to
commodity futures traders are the speed and reliability with which
it executes orders.
A PROPOSAL FOR COMMODITY FUTURES ACCOUNT PROTECTION

To protect the interests of commodity futures customers in the
event of an FCM insolvency, a membership corporation should be
created. The proposed statute would create two alternative mech102.

See T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 56-59 (2d ed.

1977).
103. See A. REINACH, THE FASTEST GAME IN TOWN: TRADING COMMODITY
FUTURES

7 (1973).

104. One commentator contrasted trading in securities and trading in futures:
While people often hold a particular security for a long time, through periods of both
increased and decreased prosperity, "[iln the commodity market there ain't no such
thing as the long run." S. ANGRIST, SENSIBLE SPECULATING IN COMMODITIES 14
(1972) (emphasis deleted).
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anisms: one for "ordinary" insolvencies and one for "emergency"
situations. An "ordinary" insolvency would occur when the FCM,
although insolvent, continues to execute orders for its customers
until the close of trading on its last operating day, and notifies the
membership corporation, the Commodity Futures Account Protection Corporation (CFAPC) of its decision to discontinue operations.
An "emergency" insolvency would occur when the FCM either fails
to execute orders at the opening of a trading day or discontinues
trading before the close of a trading day without previously notifying the CFAPC of its intention.
The basic premise of the proposed mechanism is that the customer will escape uninjured if he can continue trading as usual.
The mechanism is thus to transfer all open accounts of a defunct
FCM to an operating and efficient FCM. The customer could then
trade as he pleases, without the usual delay caused by insolvency
proceedings. To avoid preferential assignment of accounts, open
accounts could be assigned to operating FCMs on the basis of a
revolving list, with no FCM to be assigned more than an additional
20% of the present number of its open accounts. Thus, if an FCM
decided on Thursday afternoon that it would not open for trading
on Friday, an operative of the CFAPC could assign all open accounts to new FCMs on Thursday night and permit customers to
trade, as expected, early on Friday morning. In consideration for
those accounts transferred, the duty to notify customers of the
transfer would be imposed upon the transferee FCM.
After such transfer, a trustee would be appointed to liquidate the assets of the debtor and to satisfy creditors. An important
aspect of the plan is to transfer all open accounts and margin deposits without delay.
The shortcomings of this mechanism manifest themselves in a
surprise or "emergency" insolvency. In this situation, the CFAPC
would not have received notice. Traders would suddenly discover
that the FCM does not answer the telephone, or the like. The
solution to this "emergency" problem is more complicated.
First, a telephone number would be arranged at which the
CFAPC could be notified immediately in the event of an FCM
closedown. Notice of the availability of this service would be given.
Next, upon notice of the closedown, the CFAPC would arrange for
immediate placement of an operative at the closed FCM's place of
business, with access to the FCM's telephone. 10 5 The operative's
105. Each FCM would file a consent form with the telephone company to assure the CFAPC immediate access to the FCM's line.
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task would be to record and timestamp all incoming orders. 10 6
Simultaneously, a second operative would transfer all open accounts, as in the "ordinary" procedure, to operating FCMs.
Under the "ordinary" procedure, no fund would be necessary
to make customers whole. Under the "emergency" procedure, a
fund would be necessary to reimburse customers. Since this fund
would only be used in extraordinary cases, it would not need to be
as large as the SIPC fund. Moreover, due to certain aspects of this
mechanism, the fund stands to profit greatly if an emergency insol107
vency arises.
Under the "emergency" procedure, the significance of timestamping is that all orders received by the CFAPC operative would
be deemed executed, if reasonable,' 0 8 at the mean price between
the highest and the lowest price at which similar contracts were
traded during the five-minute period subsequent to placement of
the order. If no similar contract were traded within that five-

minute period, the period would be extended by five-minute intervals until a meaningful figure could be ascertained.

When an order is placed and "deemed executed," any loss or
gain that the customer has realized would be charged or credited
to his account. The open contract, in fact unexecuted, would then
become property of the "fund." The protection afforded any particular customer might be limited to an arbitrary amount. Fifty
106.

Such timestamping is already required of each FCM doing business. The

purpose of timestamping in relation to the protection mechanism is to establish a
record of transactions and orders which could be examined and effected later under
less hectic circumstances. The present requirement for timestamping states: "Each
futures commission merchant receiving a customer's order shall immediately upon
receipt thereof prepare a written record of such order, including the account identification and order number, and shall record thereon, by time-stamp or other timing
device, the date and time, to the nearest minute, the order is received." 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.35(a-1)(1) (1977).
107. In deeming orders by customers executed, the fund would pay over all
profits of the transactions to the customer. On trades where the trader misjudged the
value of his contract, selling prematurely, the fund would absorb the profit. In essence, the fund becomes a kind of "bucket shop." In a "bucket shop," the brokerage
itself takes the opposite position on each trade by a customer. These trades do not
go through an exchange. The shop simply bets against the trader. These operations
are generally illegal, but they are typically very profitable. That they are profitable
derives from one of the basic statistics of the commodity futures markets: Most speculators lose money, see note 10 supra and accompanying text. Thus, this plan presents two aspects that would tend to undercut the cost analysis of the CFTC's advisory board: The "turnover" plan would not require a fund, and the fund might
prove profitable.
108. "Reasonable" here means if similar trades are being executed on the market. If no trades are being executed in a particular market because, for example, the
market is limit down, the ordered trade will not be deemed executed.
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thousand dollars per customer would adequately cover the losses of
the majority of customers. 10 9
Once the new FCM gains control over the transferred accounts, it might immediately begin margin calls and conduct all
other essential activities of an FCM. For the period during which
no FCM has control of the account, the fund may be used to cover
the margin calls.
The purpose of the immediate assignment of accounts is twofold: It affords customers complete protection while keeping the
CFAPC out of the brokerage business. To permit the CFAPC to
trade contracts would become overly burdensome; furthermore, it
is unlikely that the CFAPC could compete with the excellent order
execution offered by experienced FCMs.
THE PROPOSED STATUTE

Most of the formational, structural, and empowering sections
of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 could be adapted
for use in this statute with minimal modification. Section 78ccc,
regarding the creation and powers of the SIPC, could be readily
adapted for use here; section 78ddd, regarding creation and
maintenance of the fund may also be mirrored. Similarly, sections
78ggg, 78hhh, 78iii, and 78jjj may be adapted with few changes.
Sections 78eee and 78fff, however, present the essential mechanisms of the SIPA; these sections must be omitted and new sections .providing the proposed mechanism must be substituted.
The mechanism sections of the proposed act read as follows:
I. DETERMINATION OF THE NEED FOR PROTECTION
A.

Notice to the CFAPC
If the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any
self-regulatory organization, or any customer, creditor, or
employee of an FCM is aware of facts which lead it to
believe that any FCM is in or is approaching financial
difficulty or insolvency, or has voluntarily or involuntarily
become subject to bankruptcy proceedings, it shall immediately noti*y the CFAPC. The FCM shall be charged

109. Cf. CFTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 67-69 (discussing commodity account
insurance).
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with the duty of notifying the CFAPC before the occurrence of any of the above-named events.
B.

Action by the CFAPC
The CFAPC shall immediately place the named FCM in
"suspect" status. The CFAPC shall immediately designate
one or more CFAPC agents to investigate the veracity of
the reported facts and the severity of the financial condition of the FCM.

C.

Function of the CFAPC Agent
The CFAPC agent(s) assigned pursuant to subsection IB
shall immediately investigate the true financial condition
of the "suspect" FCM, and either
1. determine that the customers of the suspect FCM
are in need of the protection provided by this section, or
2. determine that the customers of the suspect FCM
are not in need of the protection provided by this
section.

D.

The Finding of "No Necessity of Protection"
Should the CFAPC agent(s) assigned pursuant to subsection 1B determine that the protection of this section is
unnecessary, the agent shall, within forty-eight hours,
apprise the CFAPC, and the suspect FCM that there
is no necessity of protection. Upon such notice, the suspect FCM shall be removed from suspect status by the
CFAPC.

E.

The Finding of "Necessity of Protection"
Should the CFAPC agent(s) assigned pursuant to subsection IB determine that the protection of this section is
necessary, the agent(s) shall immediately:
1. notify by telephone (or the fastest reliable alternative available) the CFAPC, and
2. receive and timestamp orders placed by present customers of the FCM. If the FCM is receiving, recording, and timestamping incoming orders, however, the CFAPC agent(s) need only oversee those
activities. In such a case, the FCM should execute
those orders if possible.
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CFAPC ACTION UPON NOTIFICATION OF THE

NEED FOR PROTECTION
A.

Action upon Notification

Upon notification of a CFAPC agent's finding, pursuant
to subsection IE(1), that there exists a need for the protection afforded by this section, or upon notification of a
voluntary or involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy, the
CFAPC shall immediately arrange to transfer all the
operating accounts of the FCM to listed operating FCMs,
and transfer those accounts as soon as practicable. In no
event should such transfer be delayed more than twenty-

four hours after receipt of the subsection IE(1) notice.
B.

Effect of Receipt and Timestamping of Orders
Orders received and timestamped pursuant to subsection
IE(2) shall be deemed executed at the prevailing market price for the contract or option in question. The
customer will be credited for any profit accruing or loss
flowing from the transaction deemed executed at the prevailing market price. The actual open contract or unexercised option shall thereafter become the property of the
fund. Customers will be compensated out of the fund for
profitable trades, but in no event shall any customer receive in excess of fifty thousand dollars from the fund.
Customers will be liable to the fund for losses flowing
from deemed executed unprofitable trades.

C.

Orders Deemed Executed
1. Profits or losses to be paid to or collected from customers by the fund shall be calculated as follows:
Each order received shall be timestamped. Each
order will be deemed executed at the mean price
between the highest and lowest price at which similar contracts were traded during the five-minute
period subsequent to placement of the order. If no
similar contract was traded within that five-minute
period, such period shall be extended by fiveminute intervals until a figure can be ascertained. In
no event shall the calculation of this figure carry into
a later trading day.
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2. The contract shall be "deemed closed" upon the
deemed execution of a closing order. Profits or losses shall be calculated as if the trades had actually
been executed. No commissions shall be exacted
upon such trades.
III.

DISPOSITION OF ACQUIRED CONTRACTS AND
OPTIONS BY THE CFAPC
Contracts and options deemed executed pursuant to subsections IIB and IIC shall become the property of the fund
under subsection IIB. The CFAPC may maintain an open
trading account with a private FCM for purposes of disposing
of acquired contracts and options. Under no circumstances
shall the fund be used for speculative trading except as provided under this section. All profits accrued or losses sustained pursuant to such trades shall be paid directly into or
out of the fund.

IV. THE POSTING OF BONDS AND THE
RELEASE OF COMMODITY ACCOUNTS
In the event that a court of competent jurisdiction takes
jurisdiction over the assets and accounts of an FCM, such
court shall, upon motion by the CFAPC, permit the release
of all futures and options accounts to the CFAPC upon the
posting of a bond or assurance of an amount deemed necessary by the court. The CFAPC shall treat accounts so acquired as the terms of this section provide.1 10
110. If the mechanism of this proposed statute is unacceptable to Congress,
another simpler mechanism might be offered. This mechanism would consist of only
five basic provisions:
1. creation of the CFAPC;
2. provision for notice to the CFAPC as provided in proposed subsection
IA;
3. provision for automatic closeout of all open contracts;
4. provision for transfer of all option contracts to operating FCMs;
5. provision for posting bond to secure release of accounts from a court exercising jurisdiction over them, as provided in proposed subsection IV.
In this way, Congress might provide traders with an agency to represent them and a
mechanism to afford them protection. Under this mechanism, there would be no fund
and, therefore, no inhibitive costs. No actual "insurance" would be provided, but at
least some minimal protection would be afforded. This statute might easily be
drafted from the statute proposed above. It would be identical to the one proposed
with the exception of subsections IIB, IIC, and § III.
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SIPC

Section 78eee(a)(1) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970111 triggers the SIPC mechanism whenever SIPC becomes
aware of "facts which lead it to believe that any broker or dealer
subject to its regulation is in or is approaching financial difficulty."" 2 SIPC then applies to a court of competent jurisdiction for
"a decree adjudicating that customers of such member are in need
3
of the protection provided by this chapter.""1
Upon filing a section 78eee(a)(2) application, "the court to
which application is made shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor involved and its property wherever located."1 1 4 If an FCM
were also a securities brokerage, the insolvency triggering the
proposed act would also trigger SIPC. Under the present Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, SIPC would be able to
paralyze the CFAPC by applying to an appropriate court, eliminating CFAPC jurisdiction. Section IV of the proposed statute would
alleviate this situation by allowing the CFAPC to post a bond and
release the accounts. The proposed mechanism would thus alleviate conflict with the SIPC without reducing the efficacy of either

body.
It is conceivable that, under adversarial bankruptcy proceedings, SIPC and CFAPC might conflict. This is particularly likely in
the insolvency of an FCM which also operates as a securities
broker. But, as illustrated above, this adversarial role of the
CFAPC would fill a present void. SIPC preserves assets for the
protection of securities customers; as Weis illustrates, this preservation operates to the detriment of commodity futures customers,115
The CFAPC might generate some friction in such matters, but this
should be encouraged, not thwarted. Each corporation would represent and protect its respective special interest group. In this way,
justice would best be served.
CONCLUSION

The goals of the CFTC are simple and straightforward. They
include the maintenance of consistently rational, stable, and orderly supply and demand markets, and the prevention of fraud in
111.

15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(1) (1970).

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. § 78eee(a)(2).
Id. § 78eee(b)(2).
See discussion at notes B6-90 supra and accompanying text.
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advertising, marketing, or executing futures transactions. An ancillary goal of the CFTC must be to raise the level of public confidence in the commodity futures industry. The November 1976
Report to Congress by the CFTC116 indicated that "the level of
public confidence in the safety of funds appears to be relatively
high." 1 7 This is simply not the case. In 1973, for example, thirty
million people held securities of one kind or another; only half a
million people traded in futures during that same year. 1 8 Some of
this difference can be attributed to the more speculative nature of
the commodities markets. Much of it, however, reflects the lack of
public confidence in the markets, merchants, and exchanges. An
insurance or protection program such as that proposed here will
go far to instill greater public confidence, and thus to encourage
greater public participation in, the commodity futures markets.
Jack M. Platt*
116.

CFTC REPORT, supra note 15.

117. Id. at vi.
118. Fraudin the Futures?, Barron's, May 28, 1973, at 11, col. 1.
* B.A., 1973, S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook; J.D., 1977, Hofstra University. The
author was Recent Developments Editor for Volume 5 of the Hofstra Law Review,

and is presently practicing law in New York City.
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